and that which is grounded; it therefore requires the two to be distinct, whereas a thing is not distinct from itself.

If the latter is the case—namely, that this other is the effect of something else—the same reasoning applies to that other as to the first. The sequence must then either end with a being that is the source of all beings and does not depend on another for its existence, or continue without end. The former is what we seek to establish; the latter is impossible.

He then cited the foregoing arguments against an infinite regress and showed that they were all unsound, as we have already reported from him. He adopted the argument attributed to him which we have recounted, saying:

“If the posited causes and effects exist simultaneously, it is clear that considering the totality differs from considering each of its individual members, for the nature of the totality differs from that of each individual member. The totality, then, exists, and it is either necessary in itself or contingent. It cannot be necessary, for otherwise its members would not be contingent; yet they have been said to be contingent