the existence of a being whose existence is by virtue of itself, not another, and upon which everything else depends for its existence, contrary to an aberrant faction of the Bātiniyyah (esotericists).

The starting point of the argument for this is the concrete beings we observe and the sensory realities we ascertain. What exists is either necessary in itself or not necessary in itself. If the former, this is what we seek to establish. If the latter, every existent that is not necessary in itself is contingent in itself, for if it were intrinsically impossible, it would not exist. Since it is contingent, both existence and nonexistence are possible for it. Its existence must then either require a determining ground or not require one. If it does not, one of the two possibilities has prevailed without a determining ground, which is impossible. If it does require a determining ground, that ground is either necessary in itself or necessary through another. If the former, this is what we seek to establish.

If the latter, that other is either the effect of its own effect or the effect of something else. If the former, each must be the ground of the other’s existence. It follows that each must be the ground of that which grounds its own existence, and thus each must be the ground of its own existence, since the ground of a ground is itself a ground. This would make each of the two contingent beings grounded in itself. Yet what is grounded in itself cannot be contingent, contrary to the initial supposition.

Moreover, grounding existence is a relation between the ground