[In the name of Allah, the Most Merciful, the Most Compassionate: Section]

As for their discussions concerning the existence of the Necessary Existent, their perplexity over whether His existence is His very reality or something additional to it, and their discussions of His attributes and actions, this is a vast subject that we have treated at length elsewhere.

Al-Rāzī acknowledged his perplexity concerning questions of the divine essence, attributes, and actions. At times he adopts the position of one group, and at other times that of another. Al-Āmidī suspends judgment on questions concerning existence, essence, and similar matters, despite having offered no proof whatsoever establishing the Necessary Existent. He supposed that the methods mentioned ultimately amounted to inferring a necessitating ground from contingency. Thus, in establishing the Necessary Existent, he followed only this method, which is Ibn Sīnā’s method. Ibn Sīnā and his followers, however, presented it better than al-Āmidī did. They established—indeed, established—the Necessary Existent through an indubitable rational demonstration. Yet, to argue that He is distinct from perceptible beings, they employed their method founded on the negation of attributes, which is invalid.

[Al-Āmidī’s Discussion in al-Abkār of Establishing the Necessary Existent]

Al-Āmidī, however, did not substantiate the existence of the Necessary Existent at all. Rather, in his book Abkār al-Afkār (The First Fruits of Thoughts), when addressing its most important question—the establishment of the Necessary Existent—he said:

“The position of those who uphold the truth among adherents of revealed law and the various groups of metaphysical philosophers is to affirm the necessity of