existent. Rather, that was one form and this is another, and Allah Most High created one from the other. If, however, he means that there is a self-subsisting substance distinct from this perceptible body, which is a form, and that this perceptible body—which is a form—inheres in that intelligible substance, then this is among their groundless imaginings.

From this, you can understand their claim concerning universal prime matter: they assert that the bodies of the world share a self-subsisting substance.

Anyone who conceives these matters clearly and understands what he is saying knows that there is absolutely no common constituent existing in external reality between one particular body and another. Rather, each is distinct from the other in its own being, encompassing its essence and attributes. They do, however, share the property of having magnitude and other properties necessarily belonging to bodies. He also knows that a body's becoming connected after being separated is a kind of separation, and that separation and combination are accidents attributed to a body. Thus, connection and disconnection are two accidents, and what admits both is the body itself, which is sometimes connected and sometimes disconnected, just as it is sometimes combined and sometimes separated, sometimes moving and sometimes at rest.

This is discussed at length elsewhere.

[Fifth]

Al-Rāzī said:

“The fifth method—which, on close examination, is