its growth and nourishment. These attributes are more nearly integral to its reality than its extension in spatial directions, although the latter is also inseparable from it. For we know that fire, snow, earth, bread, human beings, the sun, the celestial sphere, and other things all share the fact that they occupy space and extend in spatial directions. Likewise, they all share the fact that they are characterized by attributes inhering in them and that they bear those attributes. Yet what distinguishes them from one another far outweighs what they share. The distinguishing attributes that make them different and set them apart far outweigh those that make them resemble and correspond to one another.

Those who maintain that substances and bodies are of like nature say:
Their reality consists in what they share—occupying space, having magnitude, and the concomitants of these—while all other attributes are accidental to them and require a cause other than the essence itself.

Those who maintain that they differ say:
Rather, having magnitude is to a body, and occupying space to that which occupies it, as bearing attributes is to that which bears them, having color to that which is colored, being an accident to an accident, and self-subsistence to entities that subsist in themselves, and so forth.

Now, it is known that if two existing things share the fact that each subsists in itself, this does not make them of like nature. Likewise, if they share the fact that each is a color, or each is a taste, or each is an accident, this does not make them of like nature. And if they share the fact that each has a magnitude,