broad and deep, and the substrate of magnitude is that which has magnitude. Likewise, the substrate of blackness and whiteness is that which is black and that which is white.

This applies to everything described by an attribute: the substrate of the attribute is the thing bearing it. Similarly, all that is denoted by verbal nouns, along with other accidents, has as its substrate entities that subsist in themselves. If corporeality is extension in spatial directions—length, breadth, and depth, for example—then its substrate is the thing extending in those directions, namely, that which is long, broad, and deep. Its substrate thus occupies a particular spatial location. That which bears corporeality, serving as its substrate and extending in spatial directions, is itself what requires its possession of the inseparable attributes peculiar to it. It necessarily entails those attributes, just as it necessarily entails extension in spatial directions.

Thus, the genus of body entails the genus of extension and the genus of accidents and attributes. A particular body necessarily entails a particular extension in particular spatial directions, as well as the particular attributes said to be inseparable from it. Indeed, if those inseparable attributes are supposed absent, its very reality may cease to exist. What brings about those attributes is therefore what brings about its reality.

This holds consistently for whatever characterizations may be posited as entailing their attributes, such as animality and rationality in a human being, or nourishment and growth in animals and plants, for example. A plant’s growing and taking nourishment is an inseparable attribute of it, on account of its being a body in general, and not because of any cause other than the reality peculiar to it. Rather, its reality necessarily entails