individuals also brings about its inseparable attributes. Its inseparable attributes require no cause other than the cause of its essence. This has been discussed at length elsewhere, where the falsity of the logicians’ claim was demonstrated: that differences between individuals of a species arise only from the receptive matter, and similar claims. They based this on the assumption that a reality existing externally has a cause other than the cause of its existence. This is an error that no one who understands it can doubt. Yet we have no need of this here.

Rather, we say: the mere fact that two things share the characteristic of being bodies, occupying space, bearing attributes, having magnitude, or anything else does not prevent one of them from possessing inseparable attributes peculiar to it. If its particular spatial location requires a cause other than their shared corporeality, it does not follow that what determines that location must itself have another determining cause. Indeed, observation shows the contrary: the particular spatial locations of the bodies we observe are not due to their shared corporeality, but to something peculiar to them that is inseparable from them—in the sense that what brings about their essences also brings about that inseparable attribute.

Furthermore, his statement,

“If the impossibility is due to the substrate of corporeality, this is impossible,”

may be denied.

As for his statement,

“For what is understood by corporeality is extension in spatial directions, so its substrate must itself extend in spatial directions,”

one may reply: the substrate of extension in spatial directions is that which extends in those directions, just as the substrate of occupying space is that which occupies space, and the substrate of length, breadth, and depth is that which is long