have a particular spatial location. It is therefore inconceivable for a body that has a particular spatial location to inhere in a substrate that has none. If its substrate extends in spatial directions, it is itself a body. In that case, the argument concerning its particular association with that state is like the argument concerning its spatial location: this cannot be due to corporeality or its inseparable attributes, but must instead be due to a contingent attribute that can cease to exist. Thus, that spatial location could cease to exist, which is what was to be proved.”

I say:

One may object that this proof rests on the assumption that bodies are alike in nature, whereas most rational thinkers hold otherwise. Al-Rāzī himself established elsewhere that they differ in nature rather than being alike.

It also rests on discussions of form and matter, and similar matters that cannot be treated at length here. Its invalidity can nevertheless be demonstrated by identifying where its premises may be challenged.

His statement,

“If the impossibility is due to something other than corporeality, an infinite regress follows,”

may be denied. For if bodies share what is designated as corporeality, while some possess additional attributes peculiar to them, this does not necessarily entail an infinite regress. The same applies to all other things that share one feature and differ in another. Thus, if magnitudes and animals share what is designated as magnitude and animality, respectively, while some are distinguished from others by an additional, inseparable feature, no infinite regress follows—whether bodies are held to be alike or different in nature. If they are held to differ in nature, the essence of each is characterized by inseparable attributes that are absent from the others, as with all distinct realities. If they are held to be alike, as the individual members of a species are alike, then that which brings about the existence of each individual among those