corporeality, or to something pertaining to corporeality, or to something in which corporeality inheres, or to something that neither inheres in it nor serves as its substrate.

The first alternative entails that all bodies share that attribute. If, however, it is due to an attribute inhering in corporeality, then that attribute either cannot cease to exist, in which case it is inseparable, or can cease to exist, in which case it is contingent. For in their terminology, an accidental attribute is broader in scope than a contingent attribute.

If the attribute cannot cease to exist, then, if this impossibility is due to corporeality itself, the first difficulty returns; if it is due to something else, an infinite regress follows. If it is due to the substrate of corporeality, the argument is invalid, because what is understood by corporeality is extension in spatial directions. If it inhered in a substrate, that substrate would have to extend in spatial directions, and thus the substrate of corporeality would itself be a body, because, if it did not extend in spatial directions, it would not