its cause; it need not have been preceded by nonexistence while its cause exists. This does not demonstrate that its existence cannot lag behind the existence of its cause.

There are three possible positions: that temporal coincidence is necessary, that a delay is necessary, or that either is possible. What you have stated establishes none of these. Even if it established anything, it would establish only the possibility of coincidence, not its necessity. Moreover, in what you stated there, you allowed the effect to be delayed, so there is no incompatibility between the two claims.

The most your argument establishes is that the entity acted upon—that is, the effect, the thing fashioned and produced—either has beginningless effects, like the Necessary Existent. This does not rule out the causal action involved being that of bringing something into existence. For the agent that produces these temporal occurrences acts upon them while they exist, even though they have been brought into existence. Thus, the fact that the causal action upon them occurs while they exist does not negate the necessity of their having been brought into existence.

Your statement,

“If the causal action upon them occurs while they exist, it makes no difference whether their existence was preceded by nonexistence or not,”

is merely an unsupported claim that the two cases are equivalent.

Rational people know, through necessary rational knowledge, that it is inconceivable for an originating agent to originate something beginningless and eternal that has always existed. One can conceive only of originating what did not