all eternity, or nothing among them has existed from all eternity,” is answered as follows: No particular one of them has existed from all eternity, but the kind has always existed in successive instances. Thus, the objections he raises under both alternatives fall away.

As for the first alternative, he says that if any one of them had existed from all eternity, it would both have been preceded by nonexistence and not have been preceded by nonexistence. This follows only if one of the successive events is said to be eternal and beginningless, which no rational person maintains.

As for the second alternative, his statement, “If the second alternative holds, then one may say that successive causes and effects, or other successive events, are preceded by nonexistence,” follows only if the kind to which they belong is said not to be eternal or beginningless. This is precisely the point in dispute.

The fact of the matter is that the statement, “Either something among them has existed from all eternity, or nothing among them has existed from all eternity,” means that either something among them is eternal and beginningless, or nothing among them is eternal and beginningless.

This wording admits more than one meaning. If he means that one of the successive events is eternal and beginningless, they do not maintain this. But if he means that events of that kind have always occurred one after another, and that the kind has no beginning but is eternal and beginningless, then this is what they maintain. Thus, denying beginninglessness to an individual instance does not entail denying it to the kind.

For beginningless eternity is not something with a definite starting point, such that one could ask whether any of these events occurred at that definite starting point. Rather, beginningless eternity means existence without a beginning: no matter what limit the mind conceives, that existence precedes it. Thus, when someone asks, “Did any of these events exist from all eternity?” the meaning is: Is any one of them eternal, with no beginning to its existence, having always existed?

The person who affirms this says only that the kind has always existed in successive instances. This is comparable to what Muslims and most other people say about endless eternity: events of that kind will continue to occur one after another.

Suppose someone were to say: “Events that come to an end cannot be everlasting or belong to what continues forever, because either something among them exists for all eternity, or nothing among them exists for all eternity. The first alternative is impossible, because what is everlasting does not come to an end, but continues to exist forever. Under the second alternative, all the events that come to an end are followed by nonexistence. Whatever is followed by nonexistence cannot be everlasting, since what is everlasting is that which is never followed by nonexistence, just as what is beginningless is that which is never preceded by nonexistence.”

The reply to such a statement would be: What is everlasting