that it precedes the series as a whole, for a judgment concerning individual members need not apply to the series as a whole, as has already been established.

As for the second argument, this would follow only if that upon which the existent thing depends, as a condition of its existence, were nonexistent, as in the example mentioned. If, however, it exists, the existence of what depends upon it is not thereby rendered impossible. Whether that condition is nonexistent is precisely the point at issue; this claim therefore cannot be accepted without proof.

As for the third argument, this too would follow only if succession meant that the effect comes into existence after its cause has ceased to exist. But that is not what it means. Rather, it means that the effect comes into existence later than its cause, while the cause remains in existence until the effect comes into existence, and the effect continues to exist after its cause ceases to exist. The same applies to every cause in relation to its effect. This entails neither that the nonexistent acts upon the existent nor that the causes and effects exist simultaneously. Such a sequence is conceivable in the case of causes that act by choice.”

He said:

“The more plausible approach here is to say: If causes and effects were