the existence of today would depend on the completion of what has no end. The completion of what has no end is impossible, and whatever depends on the impossible is itself impossible.”

Al-Urmawī challenged this with the objection that he and others had raised: the completion of what has no end is impossible, but whether what has no beginning can come to an end is precisely the point in dispute. This is of the same kind as al-Āmidī’s answer, since the endpoint conceded by the opponent concerns only one of the two ends, not the other—the beginning. This has already been discussed.

[Further Remarks by al-Āmidī]

Al-Āmidī then said:

“The more plausible approach here is to say: If the causes and effects were infinite in number, and each of them were possible, as stipulated in the hypothesis, then they would be either successive or simultaneous.

If they were successive, it has been argued that this would be impossible for three reasons.

First: Each of them would be preceded by nonexistence. The totality is the sum of its individual members, so the totality would be preceded by nonexistence; and every totality preceded