independent. Rather, the servant’s power and will are created by Allah. Allah has power independently, whereas the servant has power because Allah has made him capable. Allah is his Creator and the Creator of his power, will, and action. Thus, the two cases are not analogous.

The same applies to what al-Rāzī and others posit concerning the possibility of perpetual activity and the beginninglessness of the possibility of events: if we suppose that a particular event is possible, and that it has always been possible, then it would have always been possible, with no beginning to its possibility. This, however, is an impossible supposition: it supposes that something has a beginning while having no beginning, thus combining two contradictories. For this reason, al-Rāzī denied its possibility in his al-Muhassal.

What we have explained is clear and evident, and rational people agree upon it in general ن. It thereby becomes clear that asserting a conflict between rational and scriptural evidence, and categorically giving precedence to rational evidence, is necessarily known to be invalid and contradicts what rational people agree upon.

We therefore say:

The response has several aspects:

[The Detailed Response in Several Aspects. The First Aspect]

The detailed response has several aspects.

The First Aspect

His statement, “If transmitted evidence and reason conflict,” may refer to two conclusive proofs. In that case, we do not concede that a conflict is possible.

Alternatively, it may refer to two probabilistic proofs. In that case, whichever carries greater weight takes precedence, without qualification.