On closer examination, the characteristic they mention does apply to power, for its relation to the nonexistent is a matter of possibility. Knowledge, however, is different: the invalidity of its relation to the nonexistent is not a matter of possibility, since the nonexistent is, in this case, known to the knower. This does not mean that there is an attribute through which the nonexistent could be known if it came into existence; rather, it is known before it exists. By contrast, power’s relation to the nonexistent means that it is an attribute capable of relating to it if it comes into existence.

I say:

Furthermore, someone may say that what is meant by the objects of knowledge and power being infinite is that knowledge and power are capable of relating to them. Even if this is conceded with respect to power, it is not conceded with respect to knowledge. For the discussion concerns not the possibility of knowing these things, but the knowledge said to be actually existent and beginningless, relating to what is infinite. This is something that actually exists.

This objection led a group of speculative thinkers to hold that knowledge extends over the individual instances of a kind of accident, as Abū al-Maʿālī stated. This view was also reported from Abū al-Husayn al-Basrī and Dāwūd al-Jawāribī.