the occurrence of the intended effect. Thus, if the Lord made the servant will it while possessing the power to bring it about, the servant’s intended effect would necessarily occur. The servant would then be willing the existence of something whose existence Allah does not will, and this is impossible. Rather, whatever Allah wills to exist, He makes the one capable of bringing it about will its existence; He does not make him will something that contradicts what the Lord wills.

As for the Muʿtazila, on their view the Lord cannot have power over the very same effect that lies within the servant’s power ن, so the two wills cannot differ concerning one and the same thing. Both arguments are invalid, for they are founded on a conflict between the two wills, which is impossible. When the servant wills something to occur, he does not will it until Allah wills that he should will it, as the Most High says:

“For whoever among you wills to take a straight path. * But you cannot will unless Allah wills, the Lord of all worlds.”

[al-Takwīr: 28–29]

Whatever Allah wills comes to pass, and whatever He does not will does not come to pass. When Allah wills something, He makes the servant will it; and when He makes the servant averse to it and unwilling to bring it about, He does not, in that state, will it.

They therefore built their argument on the assumption that Allah wills something while the servant is averse to it. This is an impossible assumption. They borrowed it from the supposition of two lords and two gods, but this is a false analogy: the servant and everything he brings about are created by Allah. He is neither Allah’s counterpart nor His equal.

Thus, when it is said—as Abū Ishāq al-Isfarāyīnī said—that the servant’s act lies within the power of two agents, he did not mean that it lies within the power of two agents who are