like the way the genus of nonexistence encompasses nonexistents. For existents are distinct in external reality: this individual existent is distinct from that one. Nonexistence, however, is not a thing at all in external reality, nor does it admit distinctions in any respect.

Yet this argument rests on the view of those who say that the nonexistent is a thing. It is not unlikely that al-Rāzī took this formulation from the Muʿtazilites who hold this view, for they affirm that the nonexistent is a thing. Thus, this occurrence is a thing in its state of nonexistence, and that occurrence is a thing in its state of nonexistence. On this account, occurrences have distinct nonexistences established in beginningless eternity.

Those who hold this view say this of every nonexistent thing whose existence is possible, whether or not it comes into being. Thus, if someone says:

“Occurrences have beginningless nonexistences that are distinct and established in beginningless eternity,”

this would apply only to the position of those thinkers, and the falsity of that position has already been established.

Even supposing it were conceded, the answer would be what they themselves have mentioned: their being together in beginningless eternity, in any sense other than the absence of a beginning, is impossible. The absence of a beginning is not an existing thing within which such togetherness could be conceived.

On this basis, one may say: We do not concede that beginningless eternity is something fixed or something that exists. Nor does beginningless eternity have a defined boundary within which such togetherness could be conceived. Rather, beginningless eternity means the absence of a beginning: whatever has no beginning is beginningless, and whatever has no end is everlasting.