motion—although that nonexistence has no beginning—is accompanied by the existence of an infinite succession of motions preceding the motion under consideration.” That is, it is succeeded by the existence of infinitely many motions prior to the motion under consideration.

“This does not entail coincidence between what precedes and what is preceded. Accordingly, the discussion concerns the nonexistence preceding each individual motion. Thus, it is not impossible for a beginningless existent to coexist from eternity with these nonexistences in this manner, since, as explained, this does not entail such coincidence.”

He said:

“There is a subtle point here, so let it be carefully considered.”

[Ibn Taymiyyah’s Commentary]

I say: This is the objection mentioned by al-Urmawī, and others besides these two have also mentioned it. It appears that al-Urmawī took it from al-Āmidī. They say that the nonexistences being together means nothing more than their sharing the absence of any beginning or first point. In that case, the nonexistence of each motion can coincide with the existence of another, without what precedes coinciding with what is preceded.

What they have said is correct.

However, it may be said that this objection would be valid only if his argument rested solely on the claim that this entails coincidence between what precedes and what is preceded. Yet his argument was only that the nonexistences are together in beginningless eternity, and alongside them there is no