corresponding to the body’s second instant of existence, then that second instant does not belong to beginningless eternity. In that case, it does not follow that the body has always been either in motion or at rest from eternity.”
He said:
“Even if we concede that these exhaust the possibilities, why do you maintain that motion cannot be beginningless? The first line of proof they have presented would apply only if a single, particular motion were said to be beginningless. But that is not what is meant. Rather, motion’s being beginningless means that its successive individual instances have no first member. There is therefore no incompatibility between each particular motion having come into existence and being preceded by something else, and the totality of these motions being beginningless, in the sense that their succession extends back without limit.”
He said:
“What they have stated in the second line of proof is also invalid. Although each cyclical motion is preceded by a nonexistence that has no beginning, what is meant by the nonexistences preceding each of these motions being together in eternity is that those nonexistences have neither a first point nor a beginning. Nevertheless, the nonexistence preceding each