He said:

“Let this conclude our explanation of the proofs that bodies have come into being.”

[Al-Urmawī’s Objection]

I say: Al-Urmawī said:

“One might say: The weakness of both the original argument and the reply is evident.”

[Ibn Taymiyya’s Commentary]

I say: The invalidity of arguments of this kind has been demonstrated elsewhere in several ways. This argument rests on the question of whether the Beginningless is beginningless by virtue of beginninglessness or not. Ibn Kullāb, al-Ash‘arī—in one of his two positions—and a group of those who affirm the divine attributes hold that He is beginningless by virtue of beginninglessness. Al-Ash‘arī—in his other position—al-Qādī Abū Bakr, al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā, Abū ‘Alī ibn Abī Mūsā, Abū al-Ma‘ālī al-Juwaynī, and others reject this.

They also disagree concerning endurance. Al-Ash‘arī and a group who agree with him hold that He endures by virtue of endurance. This is also the position of al-Sharīf, Abū ‘Alī ibn Abī Mūsā, and others. Al-Qādī Abū Bakr and a group including al-Qādī Abū Ya‘lā deny this.

In reality, the disagreement on this issue is conceptual and verbal, as has been explained at length elsewhere. It is connected with questions concerning the attributes: are they something additional to the essence or not?

The reality is that, if by “essence” one means the essence existing in external reality, then it necessarily entails its attributes and cannot exist without them. If a necessary concomitant is assumed not to exist, that which entails it must likewise not exist. Thus, it is impossible to suppose