We said that a body’s beginninglessness cannot be identical with its being a body because, if that were so, knowing it to be a body would amount to knowing it to be beginningless. Since knowledge of its being a body is self-evident, knowledge of its being beginningless would necessarily be self-evident as well. Since this is false, this alternative is invalid.

We said that a body’s beginninglessness cannot be something over and above its being a body because, if that additional element were beginningless, its own beginninglessness would necessarily be something over and above it, leading to an infinite regress.

If, however, that element had come into being, then everything that has come into being has a beginning, whereas everything beginningless has no beginning. Thus, if the beginninglessness of something beginningless consisted in that element which had come into being, it would follow that the thing both had a beginning and had no beginning, which is impossible.”

He then said:

“If they counter by invoking its having come into being, we reply: A thing’s having come into being consists in the combination of its present existence and its prior nonexistence. It is quite possible to know of its present existence while remaining unaware of its prior nonexistence. This differs from its being beginningless, which means nothing other than its very existence. The distinction is thus clear.”

He then said:

“This is a dialectical argument involving subtle points of debate.”