and you have called its inseparable attribute a “part” and “something other than itself,” and its necessarily having that attribute “dependence.” Thus, your subsequent statement:

“Everything dependent on something other than itself is contingent in itself”

means that anything necessarily possessing an inseparable attribute does not exist in its own right, but through something distinct from itself. This is plainly false.

For it is known that anything whose essence admits of existence and nonexistence cannot exist in its own right. Rather, it must have a being necessary in itself to bring it into being. This is true: it therefore depends on something distinct from itself to bring it into being when it did not exist. This is the “other” upon which a contingent being depends. Anything dependent on something distinct from itself certainly does not exist in its own right.

But if “other” means an inseparable attribute, and “dependence” means mutual entailment, on what grounds can it be said that anything necessarily possessing an inseparable attribute cannot exist in its own right, but depends on an originator distinct from itself?

We have discussed similar matters in several places and explained that “part,” “other,” “dependence,” and “composition” are ambiguous expressions used to mislead people. Once their intended meanings are explained, the falsity of their argument becomes apparent. This is not the place to elaborate on that.

For our part, we regard this proof as sound: everything other than Allah is contingent, and everything contingent depends on a causal agent, since a causal agent acts only when what it causes comes into being. However, establishing this requires premises that al-Rāzī has not mentioned here, as has been explained at length elsewhere.

As for the objection based on the Lord’s being knowing and powerful, the answer is that