another human nature and another rationality, those are counterparts of his human nature and rationality, not the very same attributes themselves. Likewise, one human being is the counterpart of another, not that very same individual—unless “the very same” is intended to refer to the kind. Thus, someone who does what another person does may be told:

“This is the very same deed that so-and-so performed.”

What is meant is that it is precisely the same kind of deed, not the particular deed performed by that other person, for that would contradict sensory experience. It has therefore become clear that neither of two existing beings, or of two necessary beings, and the like, is composed of a shared constituent and a distinguishing constituent. Rather, each possesses attributes peculiar to itself, by which it is distinguished from others, even though it resembles others in some attributes and differs from them in others.

If it were said:

“Were two necessary beings, two existing beings, or two human beings posited, one would resemble the other in necessity, existence, or human nature,”

that would be correct. It would be possible for one to resemble the other in its nature, just as it could differ from it.

Now grant that each possesses something it shares with others and something that distinguishes it from them. As for the statement:

“It is composed of what they share and what distinguishes them,”

if this means that it possesses both attributes, it is correct. But if it means that there are parts from which its very being is composed, it is false. This is like saying:

“A human being is composed of animal nature and rationality.”

There is no doubt that both are attributes of a human being. But the claim that an individual human being has parts from which he is composed is false, as explained earlier.