he may be told:

“This is impossible, just as their sharing the very same individuation is impossible.”

If someone were entitled to say:

“This one shares in the very necessity peculiar to that one,”

then another would be entitled to say:

“This one shares in the very individuation peculiar to that one.”

The person advancing the argument has merely taken necessity in an unrestricted sense and individuation in a restricted sense. He ought to have treated both alike, either as unrestricted or as particular, since they are inseparable: the necessity of this one is inseparable from its individual being, and the necessity of that one is inseparable from its individual being. Neither can be separated from the other.

If someone reversed his statement, the resulting argument would be equivalent to his own. He could say:

“They share intrinsic individuation, since each has an intrinsic individuation, but differ in necessity, since each has a necessity peculiar to itself.”

This is plainly unsound, and so is its counterpart.

In short, no mutually inseparable attribute is more specific than another. If we posit two human beings, each has a human nature peculiar to himself, an animal nature peculiar to himself, and a rationality peculiar to himself. These are inseparable: his human nature does not exist without his rationality, nor his rationality without his human nature. Neither exists without his particular individual being, even if there exists