I say:

This has already been discussed in connection with composition, including the arguments they adduced to show that necessity cannot be accidental. An accidental attribute requires a cause separate from the essence, so the necessity of the necessary being would depend on something other than that being. Moreover, its necessity would be an accidental attribute, which is plainly untenable. Furthermore, distinguishing between intrinsic and accidental attributes among those inseparable from a reality is entirely arbitrary.

But one might say:

“When someone says, ‘They share intrinsic necessity,’ do you mean that they share necessity in general, or that one shares the necessity particular to the other?”

If he means the former, he may be told:

“They likewise share individuation in general: this one is necessary and that one is necessary; this one is individuated and that one is individuated. Individuated things share in what is denoted by ‘individuation,’ just as necessary beings share in what is denoted by ‘necessity,’ existing things in what is denoted by ‘existence,’ essences in what is denoted by ‘essence,’ and realities in what is denoted by ‘reality.’ The same applies to all other general, unrestricted, universal terms.

“Thus, they do not differ in individuation in general, just as they do not differ in necessity in general.”

If, however, he says: “They share the very same necessity,”