He also raised a composite counterargument against this proof, entailing the invalidity of one of its two premises. It rests on His—exalted is He—knowing by virtue of knowledge and having power by virtue of power. If His knowledge is necessary in itself, while His essence is also necessary, then there are two necessary beings, and the first premise is invalid. If His knowledge is contingent, then it is necessary through another, owing to the necessity of His essence. This would entail that both the effect and its cause endure perpetually, invalidating the second premise. He did not answer this counterargument, but merely said:

“As for answering the point that He knows by virtue of knowledge and has power by virtue of power, that is difficult.”

Al-Urmawī objected to what he had stated concerning the two premises. Regarding the first, al-Rāzī said:

“If there were two intrinsically necessary beings, they would share intrinsic necessity but differ in individuation. They would therefore be composed of that which they share and that which distinguishes them. Everything composite depends on something other than itself, since it depends on its constituent parts; and everything that depends on something other than itself is contingent in itself.”

Al-Urmawī said:

“One might say: necessity and individuation may be two accidental attributes of a simple essence.”