depends on Him only at the moment of its origination, not during its continued existence. This stands in contrast to the view of the eternalist philosophers, who maintain that the dependence of a contingent being on the Necessary Being does not entail its coming into being; rather, it depends on Him throughout its continued existence, eternally, without beginning or end. Both views are false.

In most of his books, he argues for the opposite view. But we affirm that everything other than the Necessary Being is originated, that causal influence operates only on something that comes into being, and that origination and contingency are inseparable. This is the view of the vast majority of rational thinkers among the adherents of religious traditions and the philosophers. Only a group of later philosophers, such as Ibn Sīnā and al-Rāzī, posited something contingent that does not come into being. This left them facing difficulties from which there is no escape—even though, in their works on logic, they agree with Aristotle and their predecessors that a contingent thing which admits both existence and nonexistence must come into being.

Ibn Rushd rejected their claim that a contingent thing which admits both existence and nonexistence can be eternal and without beginning. He said:

“No philosopher before Ibn Sīnā ever said this.”

I say: Ibn Sīnā states in several places in al-Shifā (The Cure) that a contingent thing which admits both existence and nonexistence must come into being. He thus contradicted himself on this matter in another passage.