then this is correct.
But if what is meant is that coming into being is what made the originated thing dependent on an agent, this is false.
Likewise, if contingency is understood as evidence of dependence on a cause, or as a condition for dependence on a cause, this is correct. But if it is understood as what made the contingent thing itself dependent, this is false.
Accordingly, there is no incompatibility between contingency and coming into being each serving both as evidence of dependence on a cause and as a condition for that dependence.
The dispute concerns only two questions.
The first is whether something necessary through another can be an effect, according to those who say: “The celestial sphere is eternal, caused, and contingent.” This is rejected by the vast majority of rational thinkers. They say that it cannot coexist with its agent eternally, without beginning or end. They also say that a contingent thing, which admits both existence and nonexistence, must be nonexistent at one time and existent at another. Created things are thus dependent on the Creator by their very nature. Their need for a cause is intrinsic and does not itself require a cause. Not every attribute predicated of an entity requires a cause, for that would lead to an infinite regress of causes, which is invalid by scholarly consensus. Rather, some attributes are inseparable from the entities themselves: they cannot be separated from them and do not require a cause. The perpetual dependence and need of everything other than Allah upon Him belongs to this category.
Dependence and need are therefore intrinsic and inseparable from everything other than Allah, just as self-sufficiency and being the One upon whom all depend are inseparable from Allah’s essence.
Here the dispute over the second question arises: does an originated, created thing depend on the Creator who brought it into being only at the moment of its origination, or does it depend on Him perpetually? Those engaged in rational inquiry hold two views on this.
Many adherents of the speculative theology inherited from Jahm and Abū al-Hudhayl say that it