follow that its occupying that particular spatial location is beginningless, for its relation to that particular spatial location is like its relation to that particular time.

Just as the fact that a beginningless body cannot be without a particular time does not entail that its being at that particular time is beginningless, so too with its occupying a particular spatial location.”

He said:

“There is subtlety in this, despite its being evident.”

I say:

The invalidity of this argument is further clarified by his statement:

“Every body must occupy a particular spatial location, because every existing thing that can be pointed to by the senses as being here or there must be so situated.”

The reply is: Do you mean that it must occupy a particular spatial location without qualification, or that it must occupy a particular spatial location at the moment when it is pointed to? The first is false. Not everything that can be pointed to by the senses must always occupy one particular spatial location. Every body can be pointed to by the senses, yet we know that we observe many bodies moving from their spatial locations and places.

If he says:

“Rather, it must have a particular spatial location at the moment when it is pointed to,”

then this is true. However, it can be pointed to at any time, so it must occupy a particular spatial location at every time. But it does not follow that, at all times, it can only be in that same particular location and no other.

A beginningless thing is one that has always existed. Thus, no time is more peculiar to it than another, such that one could say: it exists at that particular time