The following clarifies this: the same holds for a body whether it is assumed to be beginningless or to have come into being. A body that has come into being must also occupy a spatial location, yet it can move away from it.

If someone says:

“A body must occupy a particular spatial location, since the indeterminate has no existence in external reality. If it is beginningless, it cannot cease to be, unlike that which has come into being.”

The reply is:

Spatial location is not a positively existing entity; rather, it is a posited place. Even if it were assumed to have positive existence, the body’s being in it is a relation, not a beginningless, positively existing entity.

It may further be said:

The substance of this argument is: “If a body were beginningless, it would necessarily remain at rest, never moving away from its spatial location, because a beginningless existent cannot cease to be.”

The reply is:

If rest has no positive existence, the proof fails. If it does have positive existence, you have provided no proof that beginningless, positively existing rest can cease. You have only established that bodies, as a class, are capable of motion.

Clearly, even if every body is capable of motion and other attributes, such as taste, colour, power, knowledge, and so forth, one may then suppose that some of these positively existing attributes are eternal and beginningless because that which necessitates them must itself be beginningless. It would not follow that an attribute whose necessitating cause must be beginningless could cease to exist. For whatever has a necessarily beginningless cause must itself be beginningless, and it is necessarily impossible for it to have come into being.

If it is said:

“We observe the motion of the celestial sphere, so it is impossible to say that it has always been at rest.”