motion, and the feasibility, admissibility, or possibility of action, must either have a beginning or have no beginning. If there is no such beginning, it follows that motion and action have always been admissible and possible. They are therefore not impossible, but admissible in beginningless eternity.

If their admissibility has a beginning, it is well known that, whatever time the mind posits, admissibility is already established before it. Thus, whenever admissibility is posited, it is established before that time, without limit. It follows that admissibility has no beginning. The admissibility of motions occurring therefore holds perpetually, without a beginning, and establishing admissibility entails the absence of impossibility.

If someone says, “What is called motion is impossible in beginningless eternity,” the reply is:

“This means that what is called motion cannot be preceded by another motion in a sequence with no first motion. Yet the cessation of beginningless eternity is not contingent upon anything newly occurring, for whatever occurs anew is itself a temporally originated event. Motion would thus have been impossible and then become possible without anything newly occurring.”

If it is said, “What newly occurs is the nonexistence of beginningless eternity, its coming to an end, or something of that kind,” the reply is:

“The nonexistence of beginningless eternity is not something that existed and then ceased to exist, nor something that did not exist and then came into existence. Beginningless eternity relates to the past just as endless eternity relates to the future. Whatever is not beginningless occurs anew and is temporally originated. Thus, if it is said, ‘The admissibility of a newly occurring, temporally originated thing is conditional upon that newly occurring, temporally originated thing occurring anew,’ this means that a thing’s existence is a condition of its possibility. It is well known, however, that its existence suffices to establish its possibility.”