such inconsistency in their statements as reveals their unsoundness. Yet what they affirm in one of the two places may be correct and agreed upon, so people dispute neither it nor its premises. The premises may contain weaknesses, but because the conclusion is correct, people are lenient in accepting them.

The premises are scrutinized and disputed only when the conclusion is itself disputed.

Muslims agree that Allah, glorified and exalted is He, and the attributes inseparable from His essence cannot cease to exist. In the terminology of the theologians, calling Him “the Beginningless” has become widespread. Indeed, most of the Muʿtazilah and those who follow their approach generally refer to Him as “the Beginningless,” although some among the Muʿtazilah and others do not call Him “the Beginningless,” even though they call Him “the Eternal.” Most of them regard beginninglessness as His most specific attribute. Likewise, the later metaphysicians among the philosophers generally call Him “the Necessary Existent,” whereas their predecessors generally call Him “the First Cause” and “the First Principle.”

Thus, when someone establishes that whatever is necessarily beginningless cannot cease to exist, it is known that the Lord, who is beginningless and necessarily existent, cannot cease to exist—exalted is He. According to Muslims, there is no beginningless, self-subsisting being other than Him of which it could be said that it cannot cease to exist. Those who philosophize and maintain that the celestial spheres are beginningless say that they cannot cease to exist. Although this premise is correct in itself, it cannot serve as an argument for someone who affirms something that contradicts it, or entails something that contradicts it. For if the very argument he uses to establish it contradicts his own position, it is possible for