or what necessitates it.

That is a separate question, discussed elsewhere. As for demanding a cause for the newly occurring act, there is no difference between us and you. Indeed, our position is more intelligible than yours, for bringing things into being apart from the agent without an act arising within the agent is unintelligible, whereas the reverse is not.”

If they say to them:

“Rest is an existent reality. If it is beginningless, it must have an eternal cause necessitating it, and therefore cannot cease.”

They reply:

“Whatever comes into being either depends on a newly occurring cause or does not. If it depends on something newly occurring, your claim that bodies came into being is invalid.

If it does not, it may be argued that there is a difference between a newly occurring event that removes an existent reality and one that removes a state of nonexistence. If it does not depend on such a cause, your claim that bodies came into being is invalid; if it does, there is no difference between a newly occurring event that removes an existent reality and one that does not remove an existent reality.

For if the agent is allowed to bring into being whatever he brings into being without anything newly arising, then the state that had always obtained has changed without any cause necessitating the change other than the agent’s sheer will and power. In that case, the rest that had always obtained may likewise change without any cause necessitating the change other than the agent’s sheer will and power.

If the agent, possessing power and choice, is able to bring into being whatever he brings into being, and to make what was nonexistent exist without any newly occurring cause at all—because he can give preference to either of two possible alternatives without a determining factor—then he is able to make