Another group affirmed the existence of an eternal body. Some of them said that it had always acted and moved, while others said that action and motion subsequently arose in it.

If the first group argues against them by saying, “If a body were eternal, it could not be devoid of either motion or rest. Motion cannot be eternal, because newly occurring events cannot continue perpetually in an infinite succession. Rest cannot be eternal either, because it is an existent reality. If it were eternal, it could not cease, since an eternally existent reality cannot cease to exist: what necessitates it either does so of itself or is inseparable from what does so of itself. We then say: Rest can cease, so it cannot be eternal”—they answer them concerning the possibility of newly occurring events with their familiar responses, as noted above.

They answer the argument concerning eternal rest by saying: “What you have stated contradicts what you have stated concerning the coming into being of bodies.”

For if you affirm that bodies came into being, you must either allow an infinite succession of newly occurring events or disallow it.

If you allow an infinite succession of newly occurring events and say that bodies came into being contingent upon successive events—as some who maintain that bodies came into being have said, such as al-Urmawī, al-Abharī, and others—they say to them: If you allow an infinite succession of newly occurring events, your proof that an infinite succession of effects is impossible is invalid. It would then be possible for the eternal body to have always been in motion, and your proof that the body came into being would therefore be invalid.

But if you say that an infinite succession of newly occurring events and effects is impossible, and you affirm the coming into being of