from their differences. Otherwise, if the two entities are considered subject to the condition of difference, they are not identical in nature in the sense that does not presuppose difference. How could they be, when whatever is possible for one of two things identical in nature is possible for the other? A thing cannot be white while it is black, nor can it be black while it is white. Thus, what is possible for a white object considered subject to the condition of whiteness is not possible for a black object considered subject to the condition of blackness.

The statement:

“The difference between motion and rest is incidental, arising from being preceded by something else,”

is not conceded. Their opposition can be conceived without any thought of being preceded, just as the opposition between knowledge and ignorance, power and incapacity, and blackness and whiteness can be conceived.

The statement:

“Defining rest as the absence of motion is no more justified than the reverse,”

is an unsupported assertion. We do not concede that neither definition has priority over the other. Rather, this assertion is equivalent to saying:

“Defining blindness as the absence of sight is no more justified than the reverse; defining deafness as the absence of hearing is no more justified than the reverse; defining simple ignorance as the absence of knowledge is no more justified than the reverse; and treating one of two opposites as an absence and the other as something existent is no more justified than the reverse.”

It is well known that all these are unsupported assertions—indeed, false ones. For we know through sense perception that motion is something existent, just as we know that life, knowledge, power, hearing and sight are existent realities. As for whether what stands opposed to these is a contrary incompatible with them or