This can be explained by first setting out a fundamental principle:

If it is said that two proofs conflict—whether both are scriptural, both rational, or one scriptural and the other rational—the necessary response is that there are only three possibilities: both are conclusive, both are probabilistic, or one is conclusive and the other probabilistic.

Two conclusive proofs cannot conflict, whether both are rational, both scriptural, or one rational and the other scriptural. All rational people agree on this, because a conclusive proof necessarily establishes the truth of its conclusion: what it establishes cannot be false.

Thus, if two conclusive proofs conflicted, with one contradicting the conclusion of the other, this would entail affirming two mutually contradictory propositions, which is impossible. Rather, whenever proofs believed to be conclusive are thought to conflict, either both proofs or one of them must not be conclusive, or their conclusions must be contradictory. But where the two known conclusions are contradictory, it is impossible for the two proofs to conflict.

If one of the two conflicting proofs is conclusive and the other is not, then all rational people agree that the conclusive proof must take precedence, whether it is scriptural or rational, for probability cannot overturn certainty.

If both are probabilistic, one must seek grounds for giving greater weight to one of them. Whichever carries greater weight takes precedence, whether it is scriptural or rational.