Given this, if being preceded by another instance of presence in a spatial position is inseparable from a given instance of such presence, then it is one of its inseparable attributes. If two things differ in their inseparable attributes, the essence of one need not be like the essence of the other.

For two things are alike when they share what is necessary, possible, and impossible for them. If something is necessary for one but not for the other, they are not alike.

Al-Urmawī may say:

The invalidity of both premises has become clear, whether judged by the method of the logicians or by that of the other speculative thinkers who rejected their claims. Indeed, the various groups of speculative thinkers, both Muslim and non-Muslim, rejected much of what the logicians said concerning definitions and other matters. This is well known from the works of the theologians among the Muʿtazilah, Ashʿarīs, and Karrāmīs, and of the jurists among the Hanafīs, Mālikīs, Shāfiʿīs, and Hanbalīs. Our purpose here is not to elaborate on these matters.

Al-Rāzī said:

“Our reason for saying that it is not impossible for rest to cease is that the opponent concedes that every body can move, and that a spatially located entity can leave its spatial position. For if it is simple, the natures of its sides are alike, so whatever is possible for one is possible for another. If it is composite, this necessarily holds for its simple constituents; and its departure