a contradiction. Alternatively, he may mean something that has no beginning. He disputes whether this is possible, since it would then have an end without a beginning. It is as though he were saying: “Whatever has an end must have a beginning.”

His opponents say: “This is conceded for individual instances: every individual instance that comes to an end must have a beginning, for otherwise it would be beginningless. Whatever must be beginningless cannot cease to exist, as will be explained later.” But they dispute his claim concerning the kind as a whole, saying: “It is possible to say that Allah has always acted, doing one thing after another.”

Allah willing, we shall later present al-Rāzī’s discussion refuting this argument, which he cites here to establish the finitude of events, through reasoning to which he gives no answer.

Al-Rāzī said:

“And if the body were at rest from eternity, that would be impossible, (because) rest has positive existence, and anything with positive existence that is beginningless cannot cease to exist.”

His opponent disputed that rest has positive existence, but did not dispute that beginningless existence cannot cease. Al-Rāzī substantiated this by arguing that a beginningless existent is either necessary in itself or contingent, with a cause that acts by its essence, whether its causation operates on its own or through a necessary condition