the finitude of events as a class. But this is not the case: this proof applies only to the celestial sphere. It establishes that the sphere came into existence and that its movement cannot be without beginning or end. It thus demonstrates the falsity of the position of Aristotle, Ibn Sīnā, and others who maintain that the celestial sphere is eternal and beginningless.
This is a truth agreed upon by the adherents of the religious communities and by rational people generally. It is also the position of the majority of philosophers; only a small minority have disagreed. Hence, the proof that the sphere came into existence is strong, and al-Armawī’s objection to it is weak. By contrast, the arguments intended to establish the impossibility of a perpetual succession of events as a class are weak, while the objections raised against them by others are strong.
This helps demonstrate that what the messengers brought is the truth, that clear rational proofs agree with what they brought, and that sound reason does not contradict authentic revelation. Contradiction arises only between what is passed off as revelation, though it does not belong to revelation, and what is passed off as reason, though it does not belong to reason.
For example, some have presented the following as part of revelation: that the Lord has eternally been inactive with respect to speech and action; that He does not speak by His will or act by His will; indeed, that, according to them, it is not even possible for Him to speak and act perpetually by His will. They have attributed this position to the messengers, although it is not their position.
They have likewise presented the following as a conclusion of reason: that it is impossible for Him always to be capable of speaking and acting by His will.
Others opposed them, claiming that an individual created thing, such as the celestial sphere, is eternal alongside Him, and that its events have always continued and will continue without end. Thus, these revolutions are infinite, and those revolutions are infinite, even though one series is a finite multiple of the other. For two things to be infinite in both the past and the future, while one is several times as numerous as the other, with