taken individually is beginningless; rather, each one comes into being. Only motion in general, through the succession of individual instances, is beginningless, and it is not preceded by anything else. It therefore does not follow that all individual motions have a beginning.”

I say:

When the person advancing the argument says, “If any motion occurs in beginningless eternity and is not preceded by another, then the motions have a beginning,” he means that it is not preceded by another motion. A particular motion that is not preceded by another motion has a beginning and therefore cannot be beginningless, since only the kind can be beginningless.

If a particular motion is assumed not to be preceded by another motion, it comes into being, just as it comes into being if it is preceded by another motion.

By saying, “If any motion occurs in beginningless eternity and is not preceded by anything else, then the motions have a beginning,” he did not mean that it is not preceded by anything other than motions. For something that exists in beginningless eternity and is not preceded by anything else has no beginning. If, therefore, by “anything else” he meant something other than motions, the argument would be incoherent. What is beginningless is not preceded by anything else. Thus, according to the disputant, the kind is beginningless and is not preceded by anything else, whereas an individual instance of that kind is not beginningless and is preceded by something else.

Whatever is assumed to be beginningless is not preceded by anything else, whether it is a kind or an individual. But if it is assumed to be beginningless—and not preceded by anything else—how can it have a beginning? If, however, it is assumed to be preceded by something else, then it has a beginning. It is what is preceded by something else that has a beginning; as for what is not preceded by anything else, how can it have a beginning?