But the kind itself does not come into being, so as to be preceded by its own nonexistence. Rather, only its individual instances come into being, just as when it endures throughout endless eternity.

Thus, the nonexistence of the totality does not obtain in beginningless eternity. The nonexistence preceding individual motions is comparable to the nonexistence following them. Yet it is not said that those states of nonexistence all coexist in endless eternity.

The distinction between the nonexistence of the totality and the nonexistence of each individual instance is plain. The proponent of the argument says: The nonexistence of each instance is beginningless; therefore, the totality of these states of nonexistence is beginningless.

This is equivalent to saying: Each individual instance comes into being; therefore, the totality comes into being. Or: Everything that comes into being has a beginning; therefore, the totality has a beginning. It is likewise equivalent to saying: Everything that comes into being has an end; therefore, the totality of things that come into being has an end. Or: Each instance is preceded by something else; therefore, the totality is preceded by something else.

If someone speaking on behalf of the proponent of the argument says:

“The objector’s statement, ‘If by their coexistence you mean that they all obtain together at some moment, this is not conceded, for no moment can be posited without one of them ending at that moment,’ is incorrect, for they coexist in beginningless eternity.”

Someone speaking on behalf of the objector replies:

“Beginningless eternity is not a determinate temporal setting in which existence or nonexistence is posited, just as endless eternity is a determinate temporal setting in which existence or nonexistence is posited. Rather, for something to be beginningless means that it has always existed, or that its existence has no beginning; and the meaning of