[Arguments for the impossibility of newly arising events with no beginning]

He argued that this was impossible on six grounds:

(The first argument and commentary on it)

The essence of motion requires that it be preceded by something else, whereas the essence of beginninglessness excludes this. Motion therefore cannot be beginningless.

Abū al-Thanā’ al-Urmawī objected:

“One might say that the essence of motion being composed of an earlier part and a later part does not preclude its continuous existence through its successive individual instances, with no beginning. This is what is meant by its being beginningless.”

I say:

The crux of this objection is to ask: The proponent of the argument said, “The essence of motion requires that it be preceded by something else.” What, then, is meant by “something else”? Does it mean that motion must be preceded by something other than motion, or that some of its parts precede others? The former is false, and it is what his words suggest:

“The essence of motion