speech, together with the affirmation of these meanings, falls into this category. This is not so, for the basis for affirming these meanings is not the basis for affirming beginninglessness. Beginninglessness rests on the question of the attributes and on whether that which pertains to His will and power can subsist in Him. Affirming these meanings, however, is a separate question.

People hold four positions concerning what the term “speech” denotes. The first is that it denotes the wording that conveys a meaning. The second is that it denotes the meaning conveyed by the wording. The third is that the same designation applies separately to each. The fourth is that it denotes the two together, although contextual evidence may indicate that only one is intended. This is the position of the leading scholars and the majority of people. Accordingly, someone who affirms these meanings and holds that the term “speech” encompasses both wording and meaning, whether by general inclusion or as a shared designation, can affirm that both subsist in the divine essence.

Someone who allows this to be connected to His will and power need not affirm beginninglessness, or need not affirm the beginninglessness of a particular instance of speech, even if he affirms the beginninglessness of speech as a kind. Among those who do not allow this, one group holds that letters are beginningless, while another holds that meanings, but not letters, are beginningless. The arguments used to establish that letters come into being—such as their succession and the locus in which they subsist—are countered with corresponding arguments concerning meanings. For in our case, meanings likewise occur in succession and have a locus that is not befitting Allah Most High.

For if