with their tongues what is not in their hearts.” (al-Fath: 11)

They dispute that a judgment is present in the liar’s mind or that his words indicate a meaning within him; rather, he falsely presents his words as indicating such a meaning.

As for the second premise, it is weak. For it may be said: Suppose this is established; why, however, could He not speak with letters and meanings that come into being within His essence? This is the position of various groups of Muslims, so it does not contradict consensus.

If he refutes this by saying, “He is not a locus for originated events,” the reply is: If sound, this is itself sufficient proof, as those who adopted this argument have maintained. If it is not sound, the argument fails. It thus becomes clear that establishing its beginninglessness necessarily depends on this premise.

As for his statement, “Everyone who affirms that Allah possesses these meanings holds that they are beginningless,” this is not so. Indeed, many hadith scholars and theologians affirm them without holding that they are beginningless.

The distinction he mentioned in al-Mahsūl is as follows: If the Muslim community differs over two issues, adopting two positions, and both issues share the same underlying basis—as in their disagreement over returning the surplus of an estate to fixed-share heirs and inheritance by relatives outside the fixed-share and residuary classes—those who come after them may not introduce a position that agrees with one group on one issue and the other group on the other.

If, however, the underlying bases differ—as in their disagreement over the right of pre-emption and inheritance by those relatives—it is permissible to agree with one group on one issue and the other group on the other. Thus he supposed that the beginninglessness of