our attribute and our act, is distinct from what is recited, which is neither an attribute nor an act of ours. Yet what is recited through recitation consists of narratives, reports, rulings, and commands. Nor is what is recited—which is neither an attribute nor an act of ours—different in that what is recited through recitation consists of narration, reports, rulings, and commands. What is recited of the story of Adam and Iblīs is not identical to what is recited of the story of Moses and Pharaoh; nor are the rulings of earlier religious laws identical to those of the final religious laws. There must therefore be words that proceed from a word and return to a word.

There must also be letters from which words are composed. Those letters do not resemble our letters, and those words do not resemble our speech.”

I say:

This position, which al-Shahrastānī mentioned and attributed to the early generations and the Hanbalīs, is not among the positions mentioned by the author of al-Irshād and his followers. They reported only the position of those who identify what is beginningless with the servant’s very voice and the ink. No scholar who has expounded a position or authored a work in Islam is known to have held this view.

As for the position mentioned by al-Shahrastānī, it was held by a large group. It is one of the two positions held by the later followers of Ahmad, Mālik, and al-Shāfiʿī, as well as other groups. It is the position reported from Abū al-Hasan ibn Sālim and his followers, the Sālimiyya. It was also held by a group