created. How much more, then, the position attributed to these Hashwiyyah?

Thus, when Abū Hāmid, drawing on the writings of Abū al-Ma‘ālī and others like him, sought to refute the philosophers in his Tahāfut (The Incoherence), he stated that he would counter them sometimes with the arguments of the Mu‘tazilah, sometimes with those of the Karrāmiyyah, and sometimes with those of people who suspend judgment, just as he would address them using the arguments of the Ash‘ariyyah. In debating them, he reached points at which his sole aim was to expose their contradictions; whenever they confronted him with implications he could not evade, he retreated into suspending judgment.

It is well known that every question involving affirmation or negation must have a definite answer that is true in reality, or else require distinctions to be made.

It is also well known that the philosophers’ statements that conflict with the religion of Islam must be contradicted by a known truth of Islam that accords with clear reason. For the messengers—may Allah’s blessings and peace be upon them—did not convey rational impossibilities; rather, they conveyed matters admissible to reason. Whatever clear reason establishes as impossible cannot be conveyed by the messengers. Rather, they convey what reason does not know and what it is incapable of knowing.

It is well known that the early generations and the imams held a position distinct from those of the Mu‘tazilah, the Karrāmiyyah, the Ash‘ariyyah, and those who suspend judgment. Anyone who knows that position must report it and use it in debating the philosophers, just as he debates them using the positions of the Mu‘tazilah and others. But anyone unfamiliar with the transmitted reports of the early generations, the true substance of their positions, and the true meaning of what the Quran and Sunnah brought,