Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-Naql - Ibn Taimiya - (2/291)

Darʾ Taʿâroud al-ʿAql wa-n-NaqlIbn Taimiya

And this does not contradict his statements that He created through an act performed by His power; that acting is an attribute, that Allah has power over it, and that nothing prevents Him from it; and that He brought things into being by His command and His saying, through His power, and similar statements. For, in his view, this act and saying, which are subject to His power and are not a created entity separate from Him, did not begin to exist as a kind, although an individual instance occurs after previously not being possible.

Thus, the kind is not said to have begun to exist or to have been brought into being. Rather, in his view, Allah has always possessed this attribute.

This is why he said:

“Nor can anything created exist within Him. Nor can He be deficient, such that something is added to Him when He creates it.”

For anything whose kind began to exist would constitute an addition to the Essence. It has already been established that, in his view, a created thing is something preceded by His act through which He created it, His saying, and His power, and that a created thing can only be separate from Him.

This statement by ‘Abd al-‘Azīz refutes the Karrāmiyyah and those who agree with them, who allowed that speech as a kind, and similar attributes not previously present in Him, could begin to exist in Him. They also allowed that kinds of attributes of perfection could begin to exist in Him.

Whenever it is said:

“He did not possess a particular kind of attribute of perfection until it began to exist in Him,”

it necessarily follows that, before that, He lacked an attribute of perfection. He would therefore not have been a speaker; rather, He would previously have been characterized by the absence of speech. What ‘Abd al-‘Azīz said here parallels the statements of Imam Ahmad and other imams.

[Ahmad ibn Hanbal’s View on the Question of Allah’s Acts]

Ahmad said in his Refutation of the Jahmiyyah, under the chapter heading, “The Jahmiyyah’s Denial That Allah Spoke to Moses”:

“So we said, ‘Why do you deny that?’

They replied, ‘Allah

وهذا لا ينافي ما ذكره من أنه خلق بالفعل الذي كان بالقدرة، وأن الفعل صفة، والله يقدر عليه، ولا يمنعه منه مانع، وأنه أحدث الأشياء بأمره وقوله عن قدرته، ونحو ذلك، فإن هذا الفعل والقول المقدور الذي ليس هو مخلوقاً منفصلاً عنه ليس جنسه محدثاً عنده، وإن كان الواحد من آحاده يكون بعد أن لم يمكن. فالجنس لا يقال له حادث ولا محدث، بل لم يزل الله موصوفاً بذلك عنده. ولهذا قال: (ولا يكون فيه شيء مخلوق، ولا يكون ناقصاً فيزيد فيه شيء إذا خلقه) فإن ما كان جنسه محدثاً كان قد زادت به الذات، وقد عرف أن المخلوق عنده: ما كان مسبوقاً بفعله الذي خلق به وقوله وقدرته، وأن المخلوق لا يكون إلا منفصلاً عنه. فهذا الذي قاله عبد العزيز فيه رد على الكرامية ومن وافقهم في أنهم جوزوا عليه أن يحدث له جنس الكلام ونحوه مما لم يكن موجوداً فيه قبل ذلك، وجوزوا أن يحدث له جنس صفات الكمال، ومتى قيل: (إنه لم يكن موصوفاً بجنس من أجناس صفات الكمال حتى حدث له) لزم أن يكون قبل ذلك ناقصاً عن صفة من صفات الكمال، فلا يكون متكلماً، بل يكون موصوفاً قبل ذلك بعدم الكلام، وهذا الذي قاله عبد العزيز هو نظير قول الإمام أحمد وغيره من الأئمة. [رأي أحمد بن حنبل في مسألة أفعال الله] قال أحمد في (رده على الجهمية) : باب ما أنكرت الجهمية من أن يكون الله كلم موسى: - (فقلنا: لم أنكرتم ذلك؟ قالوا: إن الله