The second is that he means the act itself, which is willed and subject to Allah’s power, and through which the created being comes into existence.

As for “saying,” it is the verbal noun, as explained earlier, whereas “what is said” is the speech itself. One of the two copies reads “one spoken to,” while the other reads “and something said.”

On this understanding, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz’s statement:

“If he says that Allah created His speech within Himself, this is impossible. He can find no way to uphold this through analogy, reflection, or reason, for Allah cannot be a locus for things that come into being, nor can anything created exist within Him. Nor can He be deficient, such that something is added to Him when He creates it. Exalted is Allah above that!”

means that Allah cannot be a locus for what has come into being in the absolute sense—that is, something whose very kind has come into being. An example is speech, according to those who hold that speech as a kind began to exist. Such a person says that Allah became a speaker after not having been a speaker, so that speech as a kind would have come into being. Likewise, if it is said that He willed after not having possessed will, then will as a kind would have come into being. Similarly, if it is said that He knew after not having possessed knowledge, then knowledge as a kind would have come into being. The same applies to comparable claims, for Allah cannot be a locus for kinds of things that begin to exist.

On this understanding, ‘Abd al-‘Azīz would have presented several arguments establishing the falsity of al-Marīsī’s position: Allah cannot be a locus for created things; He cannot be a locus for anything whose kind began to exist; and He cannot be deficient such that something is added to Him. These are three arguments.