the speculative theologians. They argued:

“If the complete cause necessitating the world existed from eternity, the world must likewise have existed from eternity; otherwise, one of the two alternatives for a contingent thing would prevail without a determining factor. If that cause did not exist from eternity, its becoming complete would require a determining factor. The same argument would apply to this factor as to the first, entailing an infinite regress.”

This argument posed a formidable difficulty for these theologians, because they maintain that an infinite regress is impossible and that events arise without a newly occurring cause. They also maintain that a complete determining factor does not necessarily entail its effect. Rather, an agent possessing power or will gives preference to one of two things within his power, or to one of two objects of his will, over the other without a determining factor. They were thus left with two alternatives: either affirming preference without a determining factor or accepting an infinite regress. Both positions contradict their principles. Hence, some responded by turning the argument back upon their opponents and countering it with everyday occurrences.

[A response to the philosophers on the question of infinite regress]

We have explained several ways of answering this argument. One is to say that “infinite regress” can mean several things.

One is an infinite regress of efficient causes, agents, and causes. This is invalid according to clear reason and the consensus of rational people.

Another is an infinite regress in the conditions required for a cause to be fully effective. Like the preceding kind, this is invalid according to clear reason and the view of the majority of rational people.