Even if it were assumed that ‘Abd al-‘Azīz and al-Marīsī had arrived at these two premises, al-Marīsī could not force ‘Abd al-‘Azīz to accept any consequence without ‘Abd al-‘Azīz forcing him to accept something still more objectionable. How much more so, then, when ‘Abd al-‘Azīz had no need to resort to any of this? Rather, he explained that, before a created thing exists, there must be attributes and acts of Allah by which it is created. This invalidates the claim of al-Marīsī and those like him that Allah has no attributes, speech, or acts, but instead created all creatures and created the speech He called His speech without any attribute, act, or speech.

Alongside these two answers that ‘Abd al-‘Azīz could give to the argument that his position entails an infinite succession, a third answer combining the two is also possible, as indicated earlier. He could say: if an infinite succession is impossible, this objection fails; if it is possible, it can be accepted.

As we have mentioned elsewhere, Muslims and adherents of other religions who maintain that Allah Most High created the heavens, the earth, and all that is between them in six days can give a similar answer to the philosophers and others who maintain that the world has existed from eternity. The latter support their position with their principal argument, upon which Ibn Sīnā, Ibn al-Haytham, and others relied when arguing against the Mu‘tazilah and others like them among